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NOTE
THE STRIKERS' REPLACEMENTS PRESUMPTION
AND AN EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN WITH THE
INCUMBENT UNION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act)' requires an
employer to bargain in good faith 2 with representatives designated by a
majority of the employees within appropriate bargaining units.' It is fre-
quently difficult, however, to determine whether a particular union continues
to enjoy the support of a majority of such employees. This-problem becomes
even more difficult after a high degree of turnover, since many of the
employees who originally voted for the union are replaced. When this turn-
over results from an economic strike' and leads to the permanant replace-
ment 5. of a high percentage of strikers, the employer may seriously doubt.
whether a union's majority support continues.'
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 15 1- 187 (1976).
2 The duty to bargain in good faith is found in two sections of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 7 provides that "le_linployees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing ...." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
Also, section 8(d) provides that "[nor the purposes of this section, to bargain collec-
tively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representa-
tive of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith ." 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (emphasis added).
3 The NLRA § 9(a) provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining ...." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) (em-
phasis added).
' A strike is considered to be "economic" if it is in support of the bargaining
demands regarding wages, working conditions, or union recognition. Economic strikes
are distinguished from unfair labor practice strikes, which are strikes over actions in
violation of the Labor Act. Crossroads Chevrolet, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 728, 729 n.4, 96
L.R.R.M. 1612 (1977). An economic strike is converted into an unfair labor practice
strike when the employer commits an unfair labor practice which would extend the
length of the strike. R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 339 (1976).
' Economic strikers may be permanently replaced during the course of the
strike. Once permanently replaced, the economic striker is only entitled to full
reinstatement when a position, for which he is qualified, becomes available: and then,
only if in the interim he has not acquired regular and similar employment. Neverthe-
less, he may still be denied reinstatement if the employer can show legitimate and
substantial business reasons for not reinstating him. The Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R,B.
1366, 1369-70, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252, 1258 (1968), enforced 4I4 F.2d 99, 71 L.R.R.M. 3054
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 920, 73 L.R.R.M. 2537 (1970). Unfair labor strik-
ers are entitled to be reinstated upon an unconditional offer to return to work. They
can not be permanently replaced against their will. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350
U.S. 270, 278, 37 L.R.R.M. 2587, 2590 (1956).
6 Cases in .which employers have argued doubts as to the union's majority
status due to the existence of strikers' replacements include: Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc.
v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203, 100 L.R.R.M. 2824 (8th Cir. 1979); Arkay Packaging Corp.,
227 N.L.R.B. 397, 94 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1976) petition for review denied sub nom. New York
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To aid in determining whether a majority of employees continue to sup-
port an incumbent union, and in order to further the policies of the NLRA, 7
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) has developed cer-
tain presumptions. New employees, for example, are presumed to support the.
union in the same ratio as the employees whom they replace.' Recently the
NLRB and the Eighth Circuit have split over the extension of this "new
employee presumption" to situations not involving a normal turnover of
employees.' Specifically, the dispute has focused•on whether employees who
replace strikers should be presumed, like all other new employees, to support
the union in the same ratio as those employees whom they have replaced. The
current Board has answered this question affirmatively, recognizing a "strik-
ers' replacements presumption" within the broader new employee presump-
tion." If the Board's strikers' replacements presumption is accepted, then
the number of permanent replacements for striking employees cannot be
used as objective evidence to show an employer's good faith doubt of a un-
ion's majority support." As a result, the employer is obligated to continue
negotiations with the incumbent union, even though the union may no longer
have the support of a majority of the employees within the bargaining unit. 12
Printing Pressmen v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 1045, 98 L.R.R.M. 2389 (2d Cir. 1978); Peoples
Gas Sys., Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 944, 87 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1974), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Teamsters Local Union 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385, 92 L.R.R.M. 2077 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466 (1962); Stoner
Rubber Co., Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 44 L.R.R.M, 1133 (1959).
The reasonableness of the employer's doubt of the union's majority status is di-
rectly related to the composition of the bargaining unit. Permanent replacements of
economic strikers are included in the bargaining unit.. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 32
N.L.R.B. 163, 166, 8 L.R.R.M. 191 (1941). The unit also contains nonstriking workers,
strikers who have been rehired, and, if the election is held less than twelve months
after the strike has commenced, replaced economic strikers who have offered to return
to work. C.H. Guenther & Son, Inc., cl/b/a Pioneer Flour Mills, 174 N.L.R.B. 1202,
1203, 70 L.R.R.M. 1433, 1434, (1969) enforced sub nom. C.H. Guenther & Son, Inc. v.
NLRB, 427 F.2d 983, 986, 74 L.R.R.M. 2343, 2345 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400
U.S. 942 , 75 L.R.R.M. 2752 (1970).
7 The National Labor Relations Act section one provides:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by pro-
tecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment.
or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
8
 Laystrum Mfg. Co„ 151 N.L.R.B. 1482. 1484, 58 1..R,R.M. 1624, 1625
(1965), enforcement denied 359 F.2d 799, 62 L.R.R.M. 2033 (7th Cir. 1966).
9 See, e.g., Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 594 F.2d at 1203, 100 L.R.R.M. 2824 (where
the Court of Appeals refused to follow the Board's strikers' replacements presump-
tion),
Ill See, e.g., Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
" Id. at 5, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
12 Id.
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This note will examine the appropriateness of the strikers' replacements
presumption as defined and adopted by the current members of the NLRB.
First, the note will review the employer's bargaining requirements under the
NLRA focusing on both the employer's duty to bargain and the underlying
congressional policies which the Act seeks to serve. Next, enforcement of the
bargaining requirements by the NLRB will be examined. This section will
show the evolution of the Board's enforcement practices from the traditional
new employee presumption to the development of the strikers' replacements
presumption. The section will end with a review of the Eighth Circuit's rejec-
tion of the Board's strikers' replacements presumption. The note will then
evaluate the strikers' replacements presumption itself, examining its basis in
fact, its policy support., and the ability of strikers' replacements to provide
evidence of an employer's good faith doubt of the union's majority status. It
will he submitted that the strikers' replacements presumption should be aban-
doned or severely restricted in its application.
I. BARGAINING REQUIREMENTS UNDER
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A. The Employer's Duty
The National Labor Relations Act imposes a duty on an employer to
bargain in good faith with the union." Failure of the employer to bargain
makes him liable for unfair labor practice charges under sections 8(a)(I) and
(5) of the Act." The employer's duty to bargain depends upon the union's
claim to continued majority support. Should the union lose such support, the
employer is no longer required to bargain and a refusal cannot be prosecuted
as an unfair labor practice. 15
The Board has developed rules concerning the union's majority support
status which are determinative of an employer's duty to bargain. Under the
"certification year rule," a union which has been certified by the Board will
enjoy for one year, absent unusual circumstances, an irrebutable presumption
of majority support."t This presumption continues after the certification
O 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976).
" The National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1) provides that lilt shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title. - 29
U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 7 of the NLRA provides that le]mployees shall have
the right to ... bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. - 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Also, section 8(1)(5) provides that shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.'' 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (1976). For text of section 159(a). see note 3 supra.
1 ' See notes 2 and 3 supra.
1 " The "certification year rule - was approved by the Supreme Court in
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 35 1...R.R.M. 2158 (1954). in Brooks the Court found
ample policy support for the rule by noting that it would: give proper deference to the
"solemn and costly" election process by not allowing it to be reversed by a petition of
public meeting; take pressure off the union for instant results; encourage the
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year ends, but becomes rebuttable either by a showing that the union no
longer commands a majority, or by the "employer's production of sufficient
evidence to cast serious doubt thereon." ' 7  A majority of federal circuit courts
hold that once the presumption is successfully rebutted, an employer's refusal
to bargain cannot be an unfair labor practice unless it is shown either that on
the refusal-to-bargain date the union did in fact represent a majority of the
employees, or that the refusal to bargain was not based on a serious good
faith doubt of the union's continued majority status." This means that an
employer's claim that his refusal to bargain was based on a good faith doubt is
only a partial defense. If the requisite doubt is established in these courts, it.
shifts the burden to the General Counsel to prove by a preponderance of
evidence that the union did represent a majority of the employees on the date
of the employer's refusal to bargain. 19 If such proof of the union's majority
status is made, the employer's refusal to bargain constitutes an unfair labor
practice, despite the employer's good faith doubts."
If, instead of passively relying on the good faith doubt defense, an
employer seeks a Board sponsored election to determine the union's support,
his request may be denied since an employer has no independent right to
petition the Board for a majority representation election (hereinafter "R.M.
election") unless he has a good faith doubt of the union's majority support. 2 '
This good faith doubt must be grounded in objective evidence. 22 Con-
sequently, if the employer's good faith doubt depends on the existence of
permanent strikers' replacements, and the Board' presumes that these re-
employer to bargain without trying to undermine the union; and minimize interunion
raiding. Id. at 99-100, 35 L.R.R.M. at 2159.
A similar rule, creating a conclusive presumption of majority support for a
reasonable time, is applicable to unions informally recognized by employers.. NLRB v.
San Clemente Pub. Corp., 408 F.2d 367, 368, 70 L.R.R.M. 2677, 2678 (9th Cir. 1969).
Also, when an employer enters into a contract with a union that enjoys majority sup-
port, that support is conclusively presumed to continue for the duration of the con-
tract. Bartenders Ass'n of Pocatello, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 652, 87 L.R.R.M. 1194, 1195
(1974).
17
 Nat'l Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189, 194, 85 	 2657,
2660 (8th Cir. 1974).
18
 The NLRB and a minority of courts have held that a serious good faith
doubt constitutes a complete defense to the allegations of refusing to bargain. In other
words, even if the union did represent a majority of employees on the date of the
employer's refusal to bargain, if the employer can prove its good faith doubt, then an
unfair labor practice finding and bargaining order are not proper. NLRB v. Dayton
Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328, 331-32, 82 L.R.R.M. 2651, 2652 (6th Cir. 1973); Windham
Community Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1073, 95 L.R.R.M. 1565 (1977), en-
forced 577 F.2d 805, 99 L.R.R.M. 2242 (2d Cir. 1978); Arkay, 227 N.L.R.B. at 398, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1198.
19 Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 594 F.2d at 1207, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2827.
20 Nat'l Cash Register Co., 494 F.2d at 194, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2660; Automated
Business Sys. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262, 270, 86 L.R.R.M. 2659, 2664 (6th Cir. 1974).
21 NLRB v. Richman Bros. Co., 387 F.2d 809, 813, 67 L.R.R.M. 2051, 2053-
54 (7th Cir. 1967).
22 Orion Corp. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 81, 85, 89	 2135, 2137 (7th Cir.
1975). The good faith doubt standard is discussed in the text at notes 132-50 infra.
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placements support the union, the employer's request. for an R.M. election
will be denied and the employer will be required to continue bargaining with
the union.
As a result of the above Board rules and the NLRA, employers have a
strong, continuous, and often it-rebuttable duty to bargain with incumbent un-
ions regardless sometimes of the number of employees who actually support
them. A partial explanation for the imposition of this duty can be found in
the policies underlying the NLRA.
B. Underlying Congressional Policies
The NLRA seeks to promote two Congressional policies in determining
an employer's duty to bargain; namely, majority representation and industrial
peace through collective bargaining. Congress's concern with majority rep-
resentation is revealed in section 9(a) of the NLRA 23
 which provides that:
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees ... shall be the exclusive representatives
of all employees ...." 24
 The use of the word "exclusive" in the Act indicates
a clear Congressional intent to obligate an employer to bargain only with a
union that has majority support. If an employer believes that the union lost its
majority support, section 9(a), read by itself, would require an employer to
cease bargaining with the union. Congress's desire for majority representa-
tion, however, is tempered by the conflicting policy of industrial peace
through collective bargaining (hereafter bargaining stability). 25
Section one of the NLRA 26
 declares the policy of the United States to be
the elimination of obstructions to the free flow of commerce through the en-
couragement of collective bargaining." This policy is best fostered through
the maintenance of a stable bargaining environment. When an employer
doubts that a union has the support of a majority of its employees, however,
the employer is obligated to cease bargaining. Thus, there occurs a conflict
between the NLRA's policies of encouraging majority representation and
promoting bargaining stability. In attempting to reconcile this conflict, the
Board has created unnecessary confusion by enforcing the bargaining re-
quirements in situations involving new employees and strikers' replacements.
ENFORCEMENT OF BARGAINING REQUIREMENTS
BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. Traditional Board Approach:
The New Employee Presumption
The new employee presumption, simply stated, is that "new employees
will be presumed to support a union in the same ratio as those whom they
25 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
24 Id.
25 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The Supreme Court in Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S.
96 (1954), stated, "[tlhe underlying purpose of this statute [Taft-Hartley Act] is indus-
trial peace." Id. at 103.
2" 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
27
 For text of section one, see note 7 supra.
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have replaced." 28 The result of this presumption is that high employee turn-
over is by itself insufficient to justify an employer's refusal to bargain. 29
The Board has applied this presumption most often in what may be
termed "normal" turnover situations. In Laystrum Manufacturing Company,"
for example, the Board considered an employer's refusal to bargain which
was based on two factors. First, the company mentioned the closeness of the
certification election, in which seventeen employees had supported, while thir-
teen opposed, the union," Second, in the two years following the election,
sixteen of the original thirty employees eligible to vote had terminated their
employment and were replaced by eight newly hired employees. 32 During
this two year period of turnover, the union had maintained a contractual rela-
tionship with the company and had offered to negotiate a continuation."
Because of this close contractual relationship. and the lack of evidence offered
to indicate that the union had ignored the new workers, there seemed to be
no reason to doubt a presumption that the new employees would support the
union in the same ratio as the ones they had replaced. Thus, the Board con-
cluded that, "[t]he certified Union continued to represent a majority of the
employees ... [and the employer] had no reasonable basis for believing
otherwise . . .. '34 Laystrum is an example of a "normal" turnover situation,
where turnover occurred over a prolonged period and without any unusual
contributing circumstances. A second type of "normal turnover" in which ap-
plication of the new employee presumption is justified is revealed in Leather-
wood Drilling Company. 35
In Leatherwood Drilling, the certified bargaining unit was comprised of
roughnecks (derrickmen and floor hands), truck drivers, welders, mechanics
and helpers." The union did not include the more permanent office and
professional employees. 37 During the four years between the certification
election and the time at which the company expressed its doubt of the union's
majority status, a total of 1,761 employees had been hired to fill thirty-six
jobs." The turnover was so rapid that during the first five months of 1973
the company had experienced a turnover rate of almost 900 percent." The
Administrative Law judge held, and the NLRB agreed. that the velocity of
28 Laystrum Mfg. Co., 151	 1482, 1484, 58 L.R.R.M. 1624, 1625
(1965) (Footnote omitted), enforcement denied 359 F.2d 799, 62 L.R.R.M. 2033 (7th Cir.
(1966).
2" NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, 584 F.2d 293, 306, 99 L.R.R.M. 2509, 2518 (9th
Cir. 1978).
3" 151 N.1..R.B. 1482, 1.„R.R.M. 1624 (1965), enforcement denied 359 F.2d 799,
62 L.R.R.M. 2033 (7th Cir. 1966).
"I Id. at 1484, 58	 at 1624.
" 2 Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 1624-25.
" Id. at 1488, 58 L.R.R.M. at 1624.
:34 Id. at 1485, 58 1-R.R.M. at 1625.
35 209 N.1-R.B. 618, 86 L.R.R.N.1. 1187.
"I' Id. at 619, 86 I..R.R.M. 1187.
37 Id .
" Id. at 621, 86 L.R.R.M. 1187.
or Id., 86 1-.R.R.M. at 1188.
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turnover did not invalidate the presumption because, whether "nine
employees might in a given time period fill a single job previously held by a
union supporter, does not warrant an assumption that the ninth replacement.
would support the union to any lesser degree than the first."'"
Although Leather-wood is an example of extreme employee turnover, con-
sidering the nature of the industry it is still "normal" turnover. It is consid-
ered normal because it occurred over an extended period of time, rather than
all at once, and was accompanied by union contact with the new employees.
In this type of situation, with rapid turnover among a large pool of employees
with similar goals, it. is not unreasonable to expect. the new employees to sup-
port the union in the same ratio as their predecessors. Furthermore, without.
the new employee presumption the employees would have no bargaining
power, because as fast as a union could be certified its supporters could be
replaced and another election would be necessary. Normal turnover of this
type, therefore, should not give employers the "serious doubt" sufficient. to
justify a refusal to bargain in good faith.
While the new employee presumption as illustrated by Lastrum and Leath-
erwood has been widely accepted by both the Board and the courts,'" there has
been some disagreement as to the types of circumstances in which the pre-
sumption should he applied.'° At least one court has held that new
employee presumption should apply only to the - normal" turnover situation,
and that a "normal" turnover does not include the unusual and highly disrup-
tive circumstances of a strike accompanied by the permanent replacement. of
strikers.'" The NLRB, however, has extended the new employee presump-
tion beyond these normal turnover situations, to encompass even those new
employees who have been hired as permanent replacements for strikers.''
B. Extension of the Board's Traditional New Employee
Presumption to Strikers' Replacements
Early cases show a reluctance by the Board to extend the new employee
presumption to the strike situation. 45 The fact situations of these cases are
4" Id. at 618, 86 I...R.R.M. 1187 (footnote omitted).
41 See generally Laystrurn Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484, 58 1.„R.R.M.
1624, 1625, enforced 359 F.2d 799, 62 L.R.R.M. 2033 (7th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. John S.
Swift Co.. 302 F.2d 342, 345, 50 L.R.R.M. 2017, 2019 (7th Cir. 1962).
' See Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 594 F.2d at 1203, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2824.
Id.
44 See Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23 at 5, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027, 1027.
enforcement denied, 594 F.2d 1203, 100 L.R.R,M. 2824; Windham Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B.
1070, 1070, 95 L.R.R.M. 1565, 1566, enforced 577 F.2d 805, 99 L.R.R.M. 2242.
45 A summary of three early cases reveals not only the Board's earlier view of
the strikers' replacements presumption, but also a similarity in fact patterns. The first
of these cases is Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 44 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1959). 111
Stoner the Board found that the employer was justified in his serious good faith doubt
of the incumbent union's majority status. Id. at 1445, 44 L.R. R.M. at 1135. Considered
as a factor contributing to the doubt was evidence that on the date of the company's
refusal to bargain, its work force was composed of eighteen permanent replacements
for strikers and eighteen former strikers, all of whom had to cross picket lines to get to
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very similar. They involve a bargaining unit. that has at least as many perma-
nent strikers' replacements as the former strikers and the non-striking
employees combined.'" Thus, the replacements' votes could be a significant
factor in the outcome of a new certification election. The replacements have
usually been forced to cross picket lines in order to be hired and to report to
work." Also, the replacements usually have not manifested any support for
the union and are aware that they are working in opposition to a union
strike." Finally, it is typical in these situations for the unions to ignore the
replacements and not make any attempts to solicit their support." .
Historically, when presented with this type of strike situation, the Board
found that the employer was justified in claiming a serious good faith doubt
of' the incumbent union's majority status." The Board expressed this view
by stating:
While it is of course possible that the replacements who had chosen
not to engage in strike activity, might nevertheless have favored
union representation, it was not unreasonable for Respondent. to
infer that the degree of union support among those employees who
had chosen to ignore a Union-sponsored picket line might well be
somewhat weaker than the support offered by those who had vigor-
ously engaged in concerted activity on behalf of Union-sponsored
objectives. 5
work. Id. at 1443, 44 •L.R.R.M. at 1134. Speaking of these workers, the Board held it
was not "unreasonable to assume that. none of the 18 permanent replacements were
union adherents." Id. at 1444, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1134.
In the case of Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466 (1962),
the Board was again faced with deciding the union sentiments of permanent replace-
ments for strikers. In Titan, at the time of the employer's refusal to bargain, the
employment unit consisted of nineteen former strikers and twenty-seven replacements.
Id. at 215, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466. The Administrative Law judge found no evidence that
any of the replacements had authorized the union to support them. Id. Based on these
findings, the Board held that the company had good cause to doubt the union's major-
ity. Id.
In the case of S& M Mfg. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1008. 68 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1968), the
Board examined a situation where, at the time the employer had refused to bargain,
all sixty-five employees were either returning 'strikers who had resigned from the un-
ion, or newly hired replacements who had not manifested any support for the union.
Id. at 1008, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1404. The Board held that among these sixty-five
employees it could not be found that there were any union adherents. Id. at 1008-09,
68 L.R.R.M. at 1440.
46 See, e.g., Titan Metal Mfg., 135 N.L.R.B. at 215, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466; Stoner
Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. at 1442. 44 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
47
 See, e.g., S & M Mfg. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. at 1008, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1404; Titan
Metal Mfg., 135 N.L.R.B. at 205, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466; Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. at
1442, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
48 See, e.g., S & M Mfg. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. at. 1008, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1404; Titan
Metal Mfg., 135 N.L.R.B. at 215, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466.
4" See, e.g., Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 594 F,2d at 1206, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2826;
Arkay, 227 N.L.R.B. at 401, 94 L.R.R.M. 1197.
50 See cases cited in note 45 supra.
31 Peoples Gas Sys., 214 N.L.R.B. at 947, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1434.
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Thus, the Board indicated that the existence of strikers' replacements might
justify an employee's good faith doubt of the union's claim to majority sup-
port.
A review of these earlier cases shows that in the past the Board allowed
the employer to justify his serious doubt of the union's continued majority
status on an assumption that all strikers' replacements would be anti-union. i 2
In a number of recent decisions, however, the Board has begun to reverse
itself. 5" The change can be seen developing in the 1975 case of James W.
Whitfield, dibla Cullen Supermarket." The bargaining unit in this case was
comprised of four strikers who clearly supported the union and three strikers'
replac- ements. 55
 While the Board decided the majority status issue on these
numbers alone, it. chose to challenge the employer's contention that the re-
placements would oppose the union." The Board stated that, absent any
evidence indicating the replacements' anti-union preferences and in recogni-
tion of the new employee presumption, the union sentiments of these workers
would be considered unknown." This was a slight but definite step back
from the assumption that all of the replacements would not support the un-
ion. Nevertheless, the NLRB did not stop here, but went. even further to re-
verse its earlier position.•
The present position of the NLRB can best be understood by a review of
three principal cases: Arkay Packaging Corporation, 58 Windham Community Memo:
rial Hospital," and National Gar Rental System, Inc." It is important to review
52
 See cases cited in note 45 supra. This view has also found support among
legal scholars. As one commentator wrote: "It is generally assumed that the new
employees hired to replace economic strikers do not support the union. When such
permanent replacements constitute a majority of the unit, reasonable grounds exist to
question majority support." Seger. The Majority Status Of Incumbent Bargaining
Representatives, 47 Tut.. L. Rev. 961, 991 (1973) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Seger]. Another authority noted: "[1]f a new hire agrees to serve as a replacement for
a striker (in union parlance, as a strike breaker, or worse), it is generally assumed that
he does not support the union and that he ought not be counted toward a union
majority." R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 112 (1976).
5 " See. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027; Windham
Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 95 L.R.R.M. 1565.
54
 220 N.L.R.B. 507, 90 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1975).
55 Id. at 508, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1253.
	 •
5" Id. at 509, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1253. The reason that the employer even sought
to challenge the union when it appeared that the union had a clear 4-3 majority, was
because a dispute existed over the employment status of the store superintendent. The
employer claimed that the superintendent was an employee and did not support the
union. Id. Thus, a 4-4 tie would have existed. Id. The Board, however, found that the
superintendent was "a supervisor within the meaning of the Act and is, therefore, not
within the unit and ineligible to vote." Id. (footnote ommited).
57 Id.
58
 227 N.L.R.B. 397, 94 L.R.R.M. 1197, enforced 575 F.2d 1045, 98 L.R.R.M.
2389.
" 230 N.L.R.B. 1Q70, 95 L.R.R.M. 1565, enforced 577 F.2d 805, 99 L.R.R.M.
"" 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027, enforcement denied 594 F.2d 1203,
100 L.R.R.M. 2824.
2242.
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these cases together since they are closely interrelated, both in the time se-
quence in which they occurred and in their reasoning. This trilogy of cases
reveals the confusion that has existed in recent years concerning the extension
of the.new employee presumption to permanent replacements of strikers.
In Arkay Packaging Corporation , 61 one of the seven unions representing
Arkay's employees commenced an economic strike, which included picketing,
on June 10, 1974. 62
 In July of 1974, as a result of harassment at the picket
line, seventeen or eighteen employees, comprising most of the membership of
three other unions, went on strike. 63
 Five days later the employer gave the
strikers notice that if they remained on strike they would be permanently
replaced."' After the workers failed to respond, the employer hired eleven
new employees as permanent replacements for the eighteen economic strik-
ers.`''' The employer and employees had no further contact with one union
for seven months and with the other two unions for nine months." During
this period the unions Made no attempt either to enforce the union security
and dues checkoff provisions, or to require the company to make health and
pension fund contributions on behalf of the replacement employees."' Be-
tween January and April of 1975 each of the unions expressed its desire to
negotiate a new agreement."' Arkay replied that it. no longer recognized the
unions because of "valid, objective considerations" giving rise to serious doubt
as to the incumbent union's majority status."" Thereafter, the unions filed
their 8(a)(I) and 8(a)(5) charges. 70
The Administrative Law Judge found that the presumption of majority
support was rebutted." He rationalized:
It is reasonable to conclude that none of the three Unions in fact
had been designated by any of the replacements, nor is there evi-
dence to the contrary. This and their apparent lack of interest for
several months reasonably casts serious doubt on each Union's con-
tinued majority status. 72
The Judge, however, then concluded that General Counsel had met his bur-
den of proving that, at the time Arkay refused to bargain, the unions did
represent a majority." Therefore, Arkay was guilty of 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5)
charges for its refusal to bargain."
"' 227 N.L.R.B. 397, 94 L.R.R.M. 1197.
"2 Id. at 400, 94 L.R.R.M. 1197.
Id. at 398, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1198 - 99. The exact number seems to be uncer-
tain because one employee returned to work behind the union's picket lines but he
continued to pay union clues.
" 4 Id. at 401, 94 L.R.R.M. 1197.
"5 Id. at 394, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1199.
"" New York Printing Pressmen, 575 12 .2d at 1047, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2391 (en-
forcing; Arkay).
07 Id.
"8 Arkay, 227 N.L.R.B. at 398, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1199.
7" Id.
71
 Id. at 402, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1197-98.
72
 Id., 94 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
7" Id., 94 L.R.R.N1. at 1197.
74 Id. at 403, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
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In a two to one decision, the NLRB refused to affirm the ruling of the
Administrative Law Judge. 75 While the Board agreed with the Judge's find-
ing that the serious doubts of the employer as to the incubent union's major-
ity status were justified, it followed the minority view and held that such
doubt is a complete defense regardless of proof of a de facto majority. 76
With respect to the strikers' replacements presumption, the majority stated:
"As for the 11 striker replacements, we would not .. charge Respondent, in
fact or law, with a belief that they desired representation by the Unions.""
The majority, after citing the Laystrum" version of the new employee pre-
sumption, concluded that such a presumption would only apply in a normal
turnover situation.'" They explained that:
[I]n the strike situation present in this case, it would be wholly un-
warranted and unrealistic to presume as a matter of law that, when
hired, the replacements for the union employees who had gone out
on strike favored representation by the Unions to the same extent as
the strikers."
The Board limited this apparent rejection of a strikers' replacements pre-
sumption only six months later in Windham Community Memorial Hospital."
Windham is important because it reveals the Board's present position on
the strikers' replacements presumption and the confusion that exists over the
Board's interpretation of Arkay. Windham involved a strike by nurses and other
medical personne1. 82 The hospital based its good faith doubt. of the union's
majority on the fact that "20 employees did not go on strike and 40-some
were hired as replacements, some of the nonstrikers did not approve of the
strike, and the intensity of the picketing slackened." 8" Despite these asser-
tions. the Administrative Law Judge found that a good faith doubt of majority
status did not exist." Although the Judge did not find that the employer's
refusal to bargain was justified, his handling of the strikers' replacements is
noteworthy. In tallying the pro-union and anti-union vote, he assumed that all
of the replacements would not support the union." Citing the Board's deci-
sion in Arkay, the Judge said that. the strikers' replacements "might well be
presumed not to want the union to represent them. 8"
m Id. at 397, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
7" Id. at 398, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
77 Id. at 397, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1198 (footnote omitted).
78 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 58 L.R.R.M. 1642. This case was discussed earlier in
this note. See text at notes 30-34 supra.
7" Arkay, 227 N.L.R.B. at 397-98, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1 198.
8" Id. (footnote omitted) (relying on Peoples Gas Sys., 214 N.L.R.B. 944, 87
L,R.R.M. 1430).
81 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 95 L.R.R.M. 1565. It is interesting to note that Wind-
ham Hosp. was argued before the Second Circuit on February 9, 1978, three months
before that same court, with different judges presiding, decided the Arkay appeal.
1V2 Windham Hasp., 230 N.L.R.B. at 1072, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1566.
83 Id. at 1074, 95 L.R.R.M. 1565 (footnote omitted).
84 Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1566.
85 Id.
"" Id. at 1073, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1566,
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In affirming the holding, but modifying the analysis of the Administra-
tive Law Judge, a unanimous Board took the opportunity to clarify its posi-
tion on the strikers' replacements presumption."' Extending the new
employee presumption into the strike situation the Board said: The general
rule... is that new employees, including strikers' replacements, are presumed
to support. the union in the same ratio as those whom they have replaced.'"
In explaining why the Arkay decision had not classified the permanent.
strikers' replacements as pro-union, the Board in Windham characterized that
case as a limited exception to the new employee presumption." The Board
considered Arkay unique because there the unions had abandoned the bar-
gaining unit and, therefore, the workers would naturally refuse to continue to
support the union."" This explanation of Arkay, and the general rationale
underlying Windham was heavily relied upon by the Board in National Car
Rental System," the last principal case. to be examined.
In National Car Rental, all ten of the company's employees commenced a
strike on March 29, 1977. 52 On May 20, the striking employees were notified
that if they did not return to work they would be permanently replaced."
When none of the ten employees returned, National then hired ten perma-
nent replacements." National then refused to bargain with the union, stat-
ing that it did not believe that the union still represented a majority of the
employees."' National filed a petition for a representation election" and on
December 9 the Administrative Law Judge heard the case."'
" Id. at 1070, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1566.
88 Id. In support of the presumption, the Board cited Cutten Supermarket, 220
N.L.R.B. 507, 90 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1975), and Surface Indus., Inc., 224 N,L.R.B. 155,
93 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1976). The use of these cases as precedent for the Board's strikers'
replacements presumption is questionable. In Cutten Supermarket the Board held only
that the union sentiments of replacement workers were unknown. 220 N.L.R.B. at
509, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1253. Although the Board did recite the new employee presump-
tion, it did not hold specifically that strikers' replacements could be presumed to sup-
port the union to the same extent as those they had replaced. Id., see also text at notes
53-57 supra. Surface Indus. is equally poor precedent because it depends on Cutten
Supermarket in extending the new employee presumption to strikers' replacements. 224
N.L.R.B. at 163, 93 L.R.R.M. 1074.
Thus, if Windham is to be viewed as the basis for the current extension of the new
employee presumption to include permanent strikers' replacements, this extension is
not only lacking in strong precedent, but was announced in dicta. It is dicta because,
even with the classification of all the replacements as anti-union, the Board still did not
find an objective good faith doubt and, therefore, the replacements' status was not
essential to the case's determination. See, Windham, 230 N.L.R.B. at 1074, 95 L.R.R.M.
1565.
89 Windham, 230 N.L.R.B. at 1070, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1566.
91) Id.
91
 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 99 L.R.R.M-: 1027.
92 Id., slip op. at 3, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
93 Id.
94 Id.
98 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id., slip op. at 1, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
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At the hearing National based its doubt of the union's majority status on
the following factors: all ten of the company's employees went on strike and
were permanently replaced; all replacements constantly had to cross picket
lines knowing they were replacing strikers," and, there was no showing that
the replacements were contacted by the union or that they supported it.""
Citing extensively from Windham, 100 the Administrative Law Judge applied
that version of the strikers' replacements presumption and found National
Car Rental System in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 1 °' Referring to
the strikers' replacements presumption, the Judge then commented that:
"There is no way that I can alleviate Respondent's counsel from his conclusion
that the current Board law is absurd.... "102 The Board affirmed the deci-
sion without discussing the Administrative Law Judge's view of its strikers'
replacements presumption. "3
In summary, the Arkay, Windham, and National Car discussions present as
clearly as possible the Board's present rule on strikers' replacements. Suc-
cinctly stated, the Board presumes that all "new employees, including perma-
nent replacements for economic strikers, support the union in the same ratio
as their predecessors. This presumption can only be rebutted by the
employer's production of objective evidence,i" 4 such as the union's abandon-
ment of the bargaining unit in Arkay. "5 In cases following National Car, the
Board has consistently applied its strikers' replacements rule.'" This rule
remained unscathed until March 8, 1979, when the court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reviewed National Car Rental System" 7 and flatly rejected it.'"
C. Rejection by the Eighth Circuit
The employer in National Car Rental petitioned for review of the Board's
bargaining order and the Board filed cross application for enforcement. 1" In
its opinion denying enforcement, the court of appeals dealt extensively with
the strikers' replacements presumption. After citing the Windham 110 rule, the
court said:
If this presumption were to be employed here, we would reach the
ridiculous result of presuming that all of the, ten new employees fa-
98 Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 4, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
99 Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 594 F.2d at 1206, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2826.
100 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 95 L.R.R.M. 1505.
" 1 Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 3, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
102 Id. at 4, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
103 Id. at 1, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
104 Examples of the different types of objective evidence which the Board has
consistently accepted are presented in the text at notes 140-46 infra.
'°5 227 N.L.R.B. at 397, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
106 See Pennco, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 101 L.R.R.M. 1195 (1979); Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 238 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 99 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1978).
'"' 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
108 Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 594 F.2d at 1206, 100 L.R.R.M. 2826-27.
199 Id. at 1203, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2824.
10 See text at note 88 supra.
468	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:455
vored representation by the union even though they had crossed the
union's picket lines to apply for work and to report to work each day
after they were hired. This presumption of the Board is not specifi-
cally authorized by statute and is so far from reality in this particular
case that it does not deserve further comment.'"
The judges of the Eighth Circuit held, that "the presumption that new
employees hired in the normal employee turnover situation support the union
in the same ratio as those they have replaced, ... does not apply where the
'turnover' results from the hiring of all new permanent replacements for all
striking employees."'" This holding shows the Eighth Circuit's partial rejec-
tion of the rationale underlying the Board's decisions in Windham and National
Car. The court did not consider the permanent replacement of all strikers to
be "normal" turnover.
The extent to which the court's rejection of the strikers' replacements
presumption was based on its view that the replacement. of strikers is not
"normal" turnover is further illustrated in the court's conclusion that if "the
replacements had been hired over a period of time without having to cross
picket lines to apply for or attend work, (i.e., a normal turnover situation) the
presumption might have some validity."'" Under the facts as presented,
however, the court rejected that presumption and consequently found that
there was no substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that Na-
tional Car Rental System did not have a good faith doubt of the union's
majority support. 114 In rejecting the Board's strikers' replacements presump-
tion, the Eighth Circuit properly questioned the propriety of extending the
rationale of the new employee presumption to encompass the strike situation.
III. EVALUATION OF THE EXTENSION OF THE NEW EMPLOYEE PRESUMPTION
TO INCLUDE STRIKERS' REPLACEMENTS.
In the wake of National Car Rental, the National Labor Relations Board
now recognizes a strikers' replacements presumption which is unsupported by
early Board decisions, and which has been rejected by the Eighth Circuit. The
strikers' replacements presumption can not be justified by the rationale of the
new employee presumption for the presence of strikers' replacements do pro-
vide a reasonable basis for an employer's good faith doubt of the union's
majority support.
A. The Rationale for the New Employee Presumption
The underlying policy support for the new employee presumption can
be found in section one of the National Labor Relations Act."' This section
indicates Congress's intent in the NLRA to promote labor organizations for
the purpose of collective bargaining. An adjudicatory rule, such as the new
"' Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 594 F.2d at 1206, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2826.
12 Id. (footnotes omitted).
" 3 Id. al 1207, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2827 (explanation added).
119 a
15 For text of section one. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) see note 7 supra.
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employee presumption, which guarantees a presumption of incumbent union
majority, would therefore promote the intent of the Act by maintaining bar-
gaining stability.
Indeed, the new employee presumption promotes bargaining stability by
denying the employer an opportunity to refuse to bargain after an arbitrary
amount of employee turnover. If this presumption did not exist, the employer
would be permitted to deny a union's majority status following a turnover of
employees, and a company could completely bypass the bargaining process,
defend its good faith in an unfair labor practice proceeding, and shift the
burden to the unions to prove their majority status.' This unrestrained
employer's power could disrupt bargaining, undermine union support, and
cast "an impossible burden on the certified union of being perpetually pre-
pared after the certification year, without notice, to furnish independent
documentary proof of its majority as of any given moment selected by the
employer."'''
In addition to maintaining bargaining stability, the new employee pre-
sumption may be justified on the basis that there is no reason to assume that
the new employees would not want to be represented by the incumbent un-
ion. With normal nonstrike turnover, the goals of new employees should be
similar to those of the union because the new employees are hired under
circumstances similar to those of the employees who were just replaced. Also,
the new employees would benefit by being represented by a union that had
strong employee support and could better press their demands, whether the
support was real or only presumed. Thus, the new employee presumption has
merit, not only because it maintains bargaining stability, but also because it is
a rational assumption concerning the desires of the new hires. The rationale
behind the new employee presumption falters, however, once the presumption
is extended to include permanent strikers' replacements.
B. Extension to Strikers' Replacements
The strikers' replacements presumption can not be justified by an exten-
sion of the commonsense rationale offered for the new employee presump- ,
tion. As the NLRB admitted in Arka't, "in the strike situation ... it would be
wholly unwarranted and unrealistic to presume ... replacements for the
union employees who had gone out on strike to favor representation by the
"" Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. at 1447-50, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1136-38 (dis-
sent).
117 Id. at 1450, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1137 (Member Jenkins concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). In support of this contention, Members Jenkins
and Fanning provide the following example:
Assuming, ... a continuing or large turnover of employees in a plant,
and considering the minimum requisite in Section 8(a)(3) that new
employees he given a 30-day grace period before requiring their member-
ship under a union-shop contract, a true test of majority could be a virtual
impossibility without a properly conducted election; and to impose such a
burden on an incumbent union to prove its majority, without reasonable
notice, is an arbitrary and inequitable distortion of the majority rule.
Id. at 1450 n.32, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1137-38 n.32.
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unions to the same extent as the strikers." 18 The reasons for this common-
sense argument are twofold. First, the very act of the employees in accepting
strikers' jobs and crossing picket lines would indicate that they do not support
the union with the same enthusiasm as the workers who are on strike. 19
This is especially true when the strikers are so pro-union that they refuse to
work knowing that they may be permanently replaced. The second aspect of
the commonsense argument disfavoring the strikers' replacements presump-
tion is that most replacements would consider their interests to be diametri-
cally opposed to those of the incumbent union.'" The replacements might
well view the union as being loyal to the strikers alone. This would appear
especially true in the frequent examples where the union has never contacted
the replacements. In these situations the replacements must be well aware that
"if negotiations with the Union resumed they would be the prime target of
the Union, because the Union would seek their replacement immediately. " 121
Arguing this point, the employer in National Car stated that in order to pre-
sume that the strikers' replacements supported the Union we must also pre-
sume that they are idiots." 122
Since the logical conclusion is that strikers' replacements do not support
the incumbent union to the same degree as the strikers, there must exist
another explanation for the Board's use of the presumption. This explanation
can be found in the Board's desire to promote the NLRA's goal of bargaining
stability.'" The strikers' replacements presumption encourages continued
bargaining in strike situations in the same way that the new employee pre-
sumption encourages bargaining during normal turnover."' Nevertheless,
when consideration is given to the employee's right to majority representation,
found in section 9(a) of the Act,'" the factually illogical strikers' replacements
presumption can not be justified by the explanation that it promotes the pur-
Arkay, 227 N.L.R.B. at 397-98, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1198 (footnote omitted).
"9
 This was one of the arguments offered by the employer in Nat'l Car Rental
Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 4, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
12 " This argument was offered against the strikers' replacements presumption
by the employers in Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs, 238 N.L.R.B. No. 158, slip op. at
16, 99 L.R.R.M. 1353; Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 4, 99
L.R.R.M. 1027.
121 Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 4, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
122 Id. Recently, the NLRB has attempted to dispose of the common sense ar-
gument that strikers' replacements would not favor the union by reasoning that, when
a replacement accepts employment during a strike, it signifies no more than a vote of
no confidence in the strike action and a willingness or need to obtain a wage. Henry
Marx and Saul Greenburg, dlbla Ray's Liquor Store, 234 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1140, 98
L.R.R.M. 1038 (1978). The Board also reasons that since there would be no particular
reason for the replacements to presume that the union would favor the strikers over
themselves, there would therefore be no reason not to expect the replacements to
desire the union. Inel Union of Operating Eng'rs, 238 N.L.R.B. No. 158, slip op. at 17,
99 L.R.R.M. 1353.
"3
 The NLRA's goal of bargaining stability can be found in section one, which
provides for "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
124 See text at notes 116-17 supra.
'" 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976):
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poses of the NLRA. If through the replacement of strikers the union no
longer has majority support, it should not be allowed to hide behind a Board
created presumption. This would allow the incumbent union to remain in
control possibly against the wishes of the majority and would subordinate the
rights of the employees to the survival of the incumbent union. 126
This argument that the presumption is based on a policy which gives
more value to the incumbent. union as an organization than to the wishes of a
majority of the employees also can be viewed from the employer's side. The
employer might. contend that through enforcement of the strikers' replace-
ments presumption the Board causes the employer to ignore his duty owed
new employees to refuse to recognize the incumbent, and now minority, un-
ion. 127
 If the employer recognizes a minority union, he violates section 9(a)
of the Act 128 and may discourage the formation of a new union which actu-
ally does represent a majority of employees.
The strikers' replacements presumption operates counter to the intent of
the Act in another way by interfering with the efficient, flow of commerce. 129
An employer who has withdrawn recognition from a union can not take any
unilateral action with respect to working conditions without subjecting himself
to a potential unfair labor practice charge.'" If the Board finds that a
majority of employees still support the union, the employer who has acted is
then guilty of an unfair labor practice. Consequently, because the strikers'
replacements presumption allows the Board to find that a union has majority
support, when in actuality it may not, the employer is inhibited from chang-
ing the status quo without first reaching an agreement with the minority un-
ion. This rule, when coupled with the fact that the incumbent. union's consti-
tuency may be comprised predominately of strikers who have been perma-
nently replaced, creates a dilemma under the Act. If the union refuses to
negotiate, then the efficient flow of commerce is damaged. On the other horn
of the dilemma, if the union does bargain, the employees' .right to majority
representation is ignored. The absurd result follows that a union which repre-
sents a minority of working employees is allowed to determine the employ-
ment conditions of all working employees. This dilemma continues at least
until other objective evidence of the union's loss of majority is produced or
until the employees or a rival union can hold a decertification election.
126 It was stated in NLRB V. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 15 L.R.R.M. 870 (5th
Cir. 1945), that: "Contrary to a rather general misconception, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act was passed for the primary benefit of the employees as distinguished from
the primary benefit to labor unions " Id. at 774, 15 L.R.R.M. at 871. For an
excellent discussion of the conflict between the stability and majority representation
goals of the NLRA, see Seger, supra note 52.
122 Pennco, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip op. at 6, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
'2a
	 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See note 3 supra.
129 Section 1 of the NLRA provides that: "It is declared to be the policy of the
United States to eliminate ... obstructions to the free flow of commerce ...." 29
U.S.C. § 159 (1976). See note 7 supra for complete quote.
130 Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. at 1447, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1136 (members
Jenkins and Fanning, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The employer's dilemma is compounded in this circumstance since he
has no independent right to petition the Board for a majority representation
election unless he has a good faith doubt of the union's majority support."'
If the employer's good faith doubt depends on the existance of permanent
strikers' replacements, the Board will deny his petition for an R.M. election.
This combination of the strikers' replacements presumption and the good
faith doubt requirement prolongs even further the dilemma created by the
Board's presumption. The dilemma can be resolved by rejecting the strikers'
replacements presumption and recognizing that the presence of strikers' re-
placements provides sufficient evidence to support an employer's good faith
doubt of a union's majority support. An examination of the good faith doubt
standard and the sufficiency of strikers' replacements as evidence of an
employer's justified doubt is therefore necessary to complete evaluation of the
strikers' replacements presumption.
C. Strikers' Permanent Replacements as Evidence
of a Good Faith Doubt
An employer can rebut the presumption of the continuing majority
status of an incumbent union, after the certification year, 132 by establishing
her good faith doubt of the union's majority status. 133 This can be ac-
complished by presenting "clear anti conVincing evidence of loss of union
support capable of raising a reasonable doubt of the union's continuing
majority. " 134 The test requires objective evidence, although "subjective evi-
dence may be used to bolster the argument that such doubt. existed at the
relevant. time." 135 In determining sufficient doubt., all evidence is considered
as cumulative.I 36
With respect to the objective evidence aspect of the test, an argument has
been offered against using strikers' replacements as proof of an employer's
doubt. 137 This 'argument reasons that since the employer can only presume
that the striker's' replacements do not support the union, such a presumption
is riot objective evidence.'" This argument can be dismissed, however, by
recognizing that the connection between the strikers' replacements and the
conclusion that they do not support the union is so strong that a presumption
is not necessary. Instead, all that is required is the same type of permissible
' 3 ' NLRB v. Richman Bros. Co., 387 F.2d 809, 813, 67 L.R.R.N.I. 2051, 2053-
54 (7th Cir. 1967).
132 Windham Hosp., 577 F.2d at 811, 99 L.R.R.11. at 2245.
133
 Id.
134 Id. (quoting Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2cl 486, 489-90, 89
L.R.R.NI. 2879, 2881 (2(1 Cir. 1975)).
135 Orion Corp., 515 F.2(1 at 85. 89 L.R.R.11. at 2173.
"I' See Ingress-Plastene, Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 542, 547, 74 LA.R.111. 2658,
2661 (7th Cir. 1970).
"7
 Arkay, 227 N.L.R.B. at 400, 94 L.R.R.NI. at 1200 (Member Jenkins, dissent-
ing).
138 Id.
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inference that is characteristic of all circumstantial evidence,'" Therefore,
the existence of permanent strikers' replacements is consistent with the
characteristics of objective evidence necessary to prove a good faith doubt..
Indeed, the use of strikers' replacements as objective evidence is supported by
the Board's consistent use of similar inferential assumptions to rebut the con-
tinuing majority support presumption. Among these are the admission of lack
of majority status by the bargaining representatives;' 49 a decline in the
number of union dues check off authorizations; 141 lack of incumbent union
activity; ' 42 oral statements of employees, particularly when numerous and re-
liable; 143 written repudiations of the union by the employees; 144 the history of
employer-union relations; 145 and, the employees' filing of decertification peti-
tions. 14"
Although these grounds have not always been held to be sufficient proof
of loss of majority support, either by themselves or cumulatively, 147 the Board
has consistently allowed them to be considered in determining the reasona-
bleness of an employer's doubt.'" Nevertheless, the existence of permanent
strikers' replacements, a very similar and equally probative ground for doubt,
has been singled out and denied consideration by the Board. 149 In fact, the
Board has even presumed the opposite effect. 15" This inconsistent treatment
of evidence can be explained only as an attempt to avoid what the Board
evidently perceives as the unfair consequence arising from the current right
of employers to justify a unilateral refusal to bargain based on good faith
doubt.
"9 R. LEMPERT Re S. SALTZESURG, A MoDEus: APPROACH To EVIDENCE 142
(1977).
"" Universal Life Ins. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1119, 67 L.R.R.M. 1355, 1357
(1968).
"' Peoples Gas Sys., 214 N.L.R.B. 944, 946, 87 L.R.R.M. 1430, 1433; Wooster
Brass Co.. 80 N.L.R.B. 1633, 1636, 23 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1281 (1948).
142 Ingress -Plastene, Inc., 430 F.2d at 547, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2661; Arkay, 227
N.L.R.B. at 97, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1198; Dixie Gas Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1259, 58
L.R.R.M. 1587, 1588 (1965).
" 3 Faye Nursing Home. lute., 215 N.L.R.B. 658, 664, 88 L.R.R.M. 1404,
1404-05 (1974); Frito-Lay. 151 N.L.R.B. 28, 33, 58 L.R.R.M. 1328, 1329 (1965).
144 NLRB v. Gallaro, 419 F.2d 97, 100, 73 L.R.R.M. 2043, 2046 (2d Cir. 1969);
Rancid] Co.. 133 N.L.R.B. 289, 295, 48 L.R.R.M. 1644, 1644 (1961).
145 Gallaro, 419 F.2d at 102, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2047. This factor is usually used as
evidence of the good faith aspect of the objective consideration test.
14" Cadillac Mfg. Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 586, 589, 96 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1281
(1977).
147 See generally Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 490, 89
L.R.R.M. 2879, 2879 (2d Cir. 1975) (repudiation of the union by some employees and
for decertification election); Sierra Dev. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22, 23, 95 L.R.R.M.
1597, 1598 (1977) (repudiation, by some employees); Cut and Curl, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B.
1869, 1873, 94 L.R.R.M. 1332, 1332-33 (1977) (lack of union activity and repudiation
by some employees); Bartenders Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 652, 87 L.R.R.M. 1194, 1196
(clues checkoff by few employees).
148 See notes 140-40 supra.
14" See Nall Cr1/ Rental Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027; Windham
Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 95 L.R.R.141. 1565.
' 5" See cases cited in note 149 supra.
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As demonstrated above, the Board's current strikers' replacements pre-
sumption is factually unrealistic. In addition, the policy reasons favoring the
presumption are outweighed by those which can be presented against it. For
these reasons, the strikers' replacements presumption should be either totally
abandoned or, as a compromise, at least be abandoned when an employer
petitions the Board for a majority representation election.
IV. PROPOSALS
A. Abandon the Strikers' Replacements Presumption
Without the strikers' replacements presumption, permanent replacements
for economic strikers would not be presumed to support the union in the
same ratio as the strikers. On the contrary, their mere existence, particularly
if accompanied by picketing or their abandonment by the incumbent union,
would be objective evidence of the employer's good faith doubt of the union's
majority status. 15 ' Consequently, in a situation like the one found in National
Car Rental, where all the employees went on strike and all were permanently
replaced, the employer would probably have enough objective evidence to
support his good faith doubt and rebut the presumption of continuing major-
ity support. 152
 This would allow him unilaterally to refuse to bargain with
the union and to make changes without consulting the union.'"
In a less drastic strike situation, where less than all of the employees have
gone on strike and only some of the strikers were replaced, the presence of
replacements may not by itself constitute sufficient grounds for a good faith
doubt. This would probably be true even in a .violent strike situation with no
contact between the incumbent union and the replacements. 154 Nevertheless,
while the mere existence of replacements by itself may not be capable of sup-
porting a good faith doubt, the Board's willingness to view all objective evi-
dence in a cumulative manner 155 would allow evidence of replacements to
carry some weight in satisfying the good faith doubt standard. Therefore,
without a strikers' replacements presumption, the presence of strikers' re-
placements even in a mild strike situation might justify an employer's refusal
to bargain.
If abandonment of the strikers' replacements presumption does allow an
employer to establish his good faith doubt, the incumbent union is not neces-
sarily rejected. Under the view adopted by a majority of courts, but not by the
Board, an employer's good faith doubt of the union's majority status is not an
'' These two factors were stressed in Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 237 N.L.R.B. No.
23, 99 L.R.R.M. 1027.
152 Id .
L'a The employer's power to act unilaterally is discussed in Stoner Rubber Co.,
123 N.L.R.B. at 1447, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1136 (members Jenkins and Fanning, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
154 Nat'l Car Rental Sys. speaks of "all new permiment replacements for all
striking employees." 594 F.2d at 1206, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2826 (emphasis added).
155 See note 133 supra.
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absolute defense to an unfair labor practice charge.'" . The majority of
courts hold that proof of the employer's good faith doubt shifts the burden of
proving that on the date of the employer's refusal to bargain, the union did in
fact represent a majority of the employees. 157 If the union meets this bur-
den, then the employer will be held not to have had a good faith doubt.'"
Therefore, abandonment of the strikers' replaCements presumption does not
cause an automatic demise of the incumbent union.
Although abandonment of the strikers' replacements presumption does
not always allow an employer to establish a good faith doubt, and although a
majority of courts do not view an employer's good faith doubt as an absolute
defense, an argument has been offered against totally abandoning the pre-
sumption. This argument contends that abandonment. of the presumption
would impose on the union the difficult burden of furnishing "independent
documentary proof of its majority as of any given moment selected by the
employer."" The inconvenience of requiring the union to prove its majority
support is justifiable, however, because section 9(a)"" of the Act emphasizes a
union's need to represent 'a majority of employees. Nevertheless, the existence
of a strikers' replacements presumption need not be phrased in an either/or
context. By adopting a compromise rule, the Board need only partially aban-
don the factually unrealistic strikers' replacements presumption, and still pre-
vent any potential abuses that the good faith doubt standard may allow.
B. Alternative to Total Abandonment
Although many alternative solutions are available, this note will submit
only one. The Board's major concern appears to be with the employer's free-
dom, under the good faith doubt standard, to refuse unilaterally to bargain in
strike situations and consequently to avoid the Board's settlement procedures.
This concern can be abated by a partial abandonment of the factually un-
realistic strikers' replacements presumption. Under this alternative, the Board
could continue to apply the strikers' replacements presumption in all deter-
minations of an employer's good faith doubt with one exception: an employer
should be allowed to use strikers' replacements as objective evidence of a un-
ion's loss of majority support when petitioning the Board for a R.M. election.
This alternative would impose on the parties to a strike a continuing obliga-
tion to bargain until either the majority status of the union is determined by a
Board held R.M. or decertification election, 16 ' or until the employer can
prove a good faith doubt of the union's majority status, without relying upon
1511 See notes 17-19 supra.
157 Nat'l Cash Register, 494 F.2d 189, 194, 85 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2660 (8th Cir.
1974).
158 Id.
159 Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. at 1450, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1137 (footnote
omitted) (members Jenkins and Fanning, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). For discussion of this section, see note 3 supra.
1111 The alternative's emphasis on the availability of Board sponsored elections,
can also be seen in the approach suggested by members Jenkins and Fanning in their
dissent in Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. at 1449-50, 44 L.R.R.M. 1137-38.
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the existence of permanent replacements for strikers. If, an employer peti-
tions the Board for a R.M. election, the employer should be permitted to use
the existence of permanent replacements for strikers as objective evidence in
meeting the good faith doubt requirement.
The advantage of this alternative over the Board's current practice can
be seen in its reconciliation of the NLRA's conflicting goals of majority rep-
resentation and bargaining stability 162 in the strikers' replacements context.
Due to the rapid employee turnover associated with a strike, the incumbent
union may no longer be represented by a majority of the employees. In appa-
rent disregard of this fact, the NLRA'" seeks to maintain bargaining stability
between the employer and the striking union. Under current practice,
through the use of the strikers' replacements presumption, bargaining stability
is often protected to the detriment of majority representation. The proposed
alternative recognizes that these goals do not have to be mutually exclusive.
The alternative serves the same interests as the strikers' replacements pre-
sumption by denying the employer the right to unilaterally refuse to bargain,
when his requisite good faith doubt of union majority support depends on the
presence of a majority of strikers' replacements. Therefore, this alternative
avoids the disruption in bargaining and the potential for employer abuse
which the strikers' replacements presumption is designed to prevent.
Unlike the strikers' replacements presumption, this alternative also pre-
serves the goal of majority representation in union bargaining.'" It does this
by allowing the employer to consider realistically the existence of strikers' re-
placements in petitioning the Board for a R.M. election. Under present prac-
tice with the strikers' replacements presumption, an employer would not be
given a Board sponsored R.M. election if his request depended on the exis-
tence of permanent strikers' replacements.'" This is because the Board re-
quires the employer to demonstrate 'by objective evidence that he has some
reasonable grounds for believing that the union has lost its majority status
since its certification as a condition to ordering an employer requested elec-
tion.' The strikers' replacements presumption denies the employer the use
of the strikers' replacements as objective evidence in proving his good faith
doubt. By contrast the alternative, through its partial rejection of the strikers'
replacements presumption, would allow an employer petitioning the Board
for a R.M. election to assume that the replacements do not support the union.
If the union is in fact supported by a majority of employees, the election will
demonstrate this status without disruption of bargaining. if the election shows
that the union is not supported by a majority of employees, then the
employer can cease to bargain. This alternative approach would put an end to
unwarranted recognition, and would encourage the incumbent union, a rival
0.2
 A general discussion of the conflict, without the narrow lOcus on the strik-
ers' replacements presumption, can be found in Seger, supra note 52.
"3
 For discussion of section one of the NLIZA, see note 7 supra.
"" This goal is expressed in 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 and 159(a) (1976).
Richman Bros. Co., 387 F.2d at 813, 67 1..R.R.M. at 2053-54.
'c''
January 1980]	 STRIKERS' REPLACEMENTS PRESUMPTION	 477
union, or a new union to begin reorganizing the employees so that a majority
is again represented.'"
CONCLUSION
The presumption that permanent, replacements for economic strikers
support the union in the same ratio as the strikers that they replace is invalid.
The National Labor Relations Board uses this presumption in strike situations
to circumvent the employer's right to refuse unilaterally to bargain when a
union's majority status is in doubt. While this note advocates the complete
abandonment of the strikers' replacements presumption by' recognizing the
reasons which have led to the Board's utilization of the presumption, a com-
promise alternative is clear. The purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act. 1i " can be served by partially abandoning the irrational and factually un-
realistic strikers' replacements presumption and adopting an alternative rule
which would deal directly with the potential employer abuse of his right to
refuse unilaterally to bargain.
It is suggested that in a strike situation, the parties to the strike should
have a continuing obligation to bargain, at least until such time as the majority
status of the union is determined by a Board held R.M. or decertification
election, or until the employer can prove its requisite good faith doubt with-
out using strikers' replacements as objective evidence. Nevertheless, if an
employer requests a Board sponsored R.M. election, the presence of perma-
nent strikers' replacements should he allowed as objective evidence of an
employer's good faith doubt. This alternative would ease the present conflict
between the Act's majority support emphasis and its concern with the mutual
obligation of the employer and the union to settle disputes peacefully.
BILL R. FENSTEMAKER
17
 The alternative allows for greater expediency in settling disputes than does
the present strikers' replacements presumption. This expediency results because the
strikers' replacements presumption sometimes restrains the employer from petitioning
the Board for an election. See text at note 131 supra. However, this benefit of the
alternative is not always available because it is the "practice of the National Labor
Relations Board not to conduct a representation election when the employer is also
charged with an unfair labor practice which might affect the outcome, unless the
Union waives any claim to rely upon the employer's conduct to invalidate the election. -
Furr's Inc. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 84, 85, 59 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2769 (10th Cir. 1965). Thus,
if the employer is charged with an unfair labor• practice, even if he could use the
strikers' replacements as evidence of his good faith doubt, as the alternative allows,.the
election would be considerably delayed. This possibility restricts one of the benefits of
the alternative and argues favorably for the abandonment of the strikers' replacements
presumption without providing all accompanying duty to continue bargaining.
It should be noted that the alternative is not susceptible to defeat just because a
union claims an unfair labor practice offense. The filing of an unproven unfair labor
practice charge does not relieve the Board front considering and acting on a decertifi-
cation petition. Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2c1 1064, 1069, 77
L.R.R.11-1. 2392, 2396 (5th Cir. 1971). Also, if the charge was for a violation of the
section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), then under the alternative
the employer could still point to the presence of strikers' replacements as evidence of
his good faith doubt.
"8
 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
